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DOE V. WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY: THE
COMMON AREA CAVEAT AS A PARADIGMATIC
BALANCE BETWEEN TENANT SAFETY AND
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Iyen Acosta+
The gun rights debate is a staple of American culture, yet lack of guidance
by the Supreme Court has left the scope of the Second Amendment unsettled.1
Until recently, the Second Amendment was conspicuously absent from the
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1. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2009) (noting that the Supreme
Court has failed to adequately determine the scope of the Second Amendment); HARRY
HENDERSON, GUN CONTROL 4 (2000) (stating that the national gun debate began in 1927 when
the federal government first started regulating firearms); B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American
Gun War, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1976, at 37 (noting that the “vigorous, often vociferous debate”
over gun control in the United States has raged since the late 1960s); Richard Hofstadter, America
As a Gun Culture, AMERICAN HERITAGE, Oct. 1970, at 4, 85 (criticizing the United States as
being “the only modern industrial urban nation that persists in maintaining a gun culture” and
questioning “how grave a domestic gun catastrophe would have to be in order to persuade” the
country to adopt gun control reforms); Brad Bannon, We Must Debate Gun Control Before
Memory of Aurora Fades, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT OPINION (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/brad-bannon/2012/08/02/we-must-have-gun-control
-debate-before-memory-of-aurora-fades (arguing that a discussion about gun control is long
overdue and suggesting that the time was right in the aftermath of the mass shooting in Aurora,
Colorado); Brian Montopoli, Gun Control Debate Returns After Colorado Shooting, CBS NEWS
(July 21, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57476737-503544/gun
-control-debate-returns-after-colorado-shooting/ (quoting several politicians arguing for a
renewed debate over gun control in the aftermath of the Aurora shooting); Scalia Opens Door for
Gun-Control Legislation, Extends Slow Burning Debate, FOXNEWS (July 30, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/29/scalia-opens-door-for-gun-control-legislation/
(discussing Justice Scalia’s appearance on “FoxNews Sunday” where he said that gun-control
legislation is still a possibility under the Second Amendment and acknowledged that District of
Columbia v. Heller left the question of the constitutionality of limits on gun ownership open);
James Taranto, OK, Let’s Debate Gun Control! A Second Obama Term Could Kill the Second
Amendment, Best of the World Today, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2012, 14:05 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444025204577544881193377296.html
(suggesting that the Supreme Court will play a major role in the gun control debate and
acknowledging that new presidential appointees could affect the future of the Second
Amendment).
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Supreme Court docket.2 Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,3 the Court
had not addressed the Second Amendment’s range of protection since the late
nineteenth century, when its holdings were limited at best.4 This all changed in
2008.5
Prior to 2008, the few Supreme Court cases that addressed the Second
Amendment’s scope suggested that the Second Amendment generally
restricted the federal government from infringing upon the right to bear arms6
when it was reasonably related to militia service.7 The militia interpretation
predominated both case law and legal scholarship prior to 1960.8 In contrast,
the minority view interprets the Second Amendment as conferring an
individual right to bear arms.9 The “individual right” interpretation’s increased
popularity among legal scholars is a relatively new phenomenon in Second
Amendment jurisprudence.10
2. See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 25 (2011) (noting that after ruling on a gun control case in 1939, the Court declined to
rule on a Second Amendment case for seventy years); Sanford, Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989), reprinted in GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 137, 139 (Robert
J. Cottrol ed., 1994) (stating that the Second Amendment has not been “at the forefront of
constitutional discussion”).
3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
4. CHARLES, supra note 1, at 6; see also infra note 29 and accompanying text (taking note
of the Court’s late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century opinions in United States v.
Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and United States v. Miller).
5. See infra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (stating that the right to
“‘bear[] arms for a lawful purpose.’ . . . is not a right granted by the Constitution;” rather, the
Second Amendment declares that the right to bear arms “shall not be infringed by Congress”).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (stating that the purpose of
the Second Amendment was “to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of
[militia] forces” and as such, “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view”).
8. WINKLER, supra note 2, at 24–25 (discussing the “militia theory” of the Second
Amendment, which courts used to reason that the Second Amendment “was not intended to
protect an individual right to bear arms for self-protection”); ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER LAW 51 (2011) (noting that prior to 1960, law
journals and courts as far back as the late-nineteenth century interpreted the Second Amendment
as applying exclusively to militias) [hereinafter SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms].
9. See George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of
Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113,
2134 (2008) (describing the individual right model as protecting an individual’s right to bear
arms, regardless of whether he is involved in military service).
10. See Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, in THE
SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, 16, app. at 36–47 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (listing
law journal articles addressing the right to bear arms chronologically from 1912-1999 and
showing that articles advocating for the individual rights interpretation did not appear until 1967,
but practically dominated legal scholarship by the mid-1980s) [hereinafter SPITZER, Lost and
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The Supreme Court adopted the individual-rights-centered approach as
applied to the federal government in District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008.11
In Heller, the Supreme Court reversed almost seventy years of Second
Amendment jurisprudence12 by holding a D.C. ban on handguns
unconstitutional, and thereby established that the Second Amendment
guaranteed an individual right to bear arms.13 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court extended Heller and held that the Second Amendment right
to bear arms is not limited to the District of Columbia (and the federal
government) but also applies at the state and local government levels.14
Proponents of the individual rights interpretation hailed these two decisions as
validating their interpretation of the Second Amendment.15 In the aftermath of
the Heller and McDonald decisions, however, the question of how to comply
with this radical development in Second Amendment jurisprudence
remained.16 State and local governments and the lower courts were left to
grapple with how to implement the individual-rights interpretation.17 Among
these government agencies are public housing authorities that now have to
Found]; see also SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 51 (noting that the idea that the
Second Amendment confers the right to bear arms on all citizens did not appear in law journal
articles until the 1960s); WINKLER, supra note 2, at x (“Indeed, the gun rights movement so
familiar to modern-day Americans is a relatively new phenomenon, even though the ability of
individuals to bear arms is one of our oldest constitutional rights.”).
11. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (stating “that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms”).
12. Before Heller, the last Supreme Court case directly addressing the Second Amendment
was United States v. Miller, which was decided in 1939. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178 (1939); WINKLER, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that after Miller, the Supreme Court
declined to rule on any Second Amendment issues for almost seventy years).
13. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
14. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second
Amendment individual right to keep and bear arms applied to the individual states by operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Dan Eggen, Supreme Court Affirms Fundamental Right to
Bear Arms, WASH. POST, June 29, 2010, at A1 (stating that the McDonald decision was “a
long-sought victory for gun rights advocates”); Adam Liptak, Justices Extend Firearm Rights in
5-4 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A1 (stating that “[t]he ruling is an enormous symbolic
victory for supporters of gun rights”); Bill Mears, High Court Strikes Down Gun Ban, U.S.
CNN.com (June 26, 2008, 7:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/26/scotus.guns/ (“The
National Rifle Association said the high court had given it the ammunition to challenge other
cities’ gun-control measures.”).
16. See Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller
and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2011) (noting that neither Heller nor McDonald
established a standard for reviewing existing gun laws under the new individual-rights
interpretations).
17. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 703 (2012) (highlighting that lower courts are
struggling with “what level of scrutiny or test should be used to assess the validity of gun laws” in
the wake of Heller and McDonald because neither court set out a clear standard to use in
evaluating gun laws).
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balance their duty to provide “decent and safe” affordable housing to their
tenants18 under the United States Housing Act of 193719 with implementing the
individual-rights interpretation.
In 2010, residents of the Wilmington Housing Authority (WHA) filed suit
against WHA for infringing their Second Amendment right to bear arms.20
The original complaint was directed at a lease provision that prohibited all
firearms on WHA property.21 In an effort to comply with the Heller and
McDonald decisions, WHA subsequently amended its firearms policy to
provide for the legal use and possession of firearms on housing authority
property with the caveat that firearms were strictly prohibited from the
“common areas.”22 In response, the residents amended their complaint to
challenge the recently amended firearms policy, arguing that the common area
caveat also violated their Second Amendment rights.23 In a significant
decision for public housing authorities across the country, the United States
District Court of Delaware held in Doe v. Wilmington Housing Authority that
the amended firearms policy and the common area caveat did in fact comply
with the Heller and McDonald decisions and did not infringe on the residents’
Second Amendment right to bear arms.24 Despite plaintiffs’ efforts to overturn
the Doe decision on appeal,25 the common area caveat provides housing
authorities across the country with a paradigmatic balance between providing
safe housing for their residents and respecting their residents’ Second
Amendment rights.26
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1) (2006); Rivera v. Reading Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1323, 1329
(E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth. 8 F.3d 961 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating that “the purpose of the Housing Act is . . . to establish a program of federal aid to local
agencies engaged in providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing for lower income families”);
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., In the Crossfire: The Impact of Gun Violence on Public
Housing Communities 1 (2000), available at http://archives.hud.gov/news/2000/crossfir.pdf
(noting the challenges public housing authorities faced in reducing gun violence).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et. seq. (2006) (establishing a public housing agency to help states
improve housing availability and conditions).
20. Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, 3–4, Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth. 880
F. Supp. 2d 513 (D. Del. 2012), appeal docketed No. 12-3433 (3rd Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (C.A. No.
1:10-00473-LPS), cert. granted (De. July 30, 2013) (No. 403,2013).
21. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (noting that the lease agreement required residents “‘[n]ot
to display, use or possess . . . any firearms . . . anywhere on the property of the Authority’”).
22. Id. at 519–20.
23. Id. at 520.
24. Id. at 537–38.
25. Appellants Charles Boone and Jane Doe filed a Notice of Appeal in the United States
District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Aug. 27, 2012. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal,
Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (C.A. No. 1:10-00473-LPS).
26. See Sean O’Sullivan & Jesse Paul, Gun Ruling May Become a Model for Nation,
(Wilmington, Del. News), USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/nation/stoary/2012-01-01/gun-restrictions-wilmington/56644990/1
(noting
that the Doe decision set a precedent for housing authorities and will have an effect on future
cases handling similar issues)
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Part I of this Note first provides an overview of Second Amendment
jurisprudence prior to the Heller and McDonald decisions. Part I then analyzes
the Heller and McDonald decisions in detail and surveys circuit court decisions
interpreting Heller and McDonald. Next, Part I focuses on public housing
authorities and the challenges of fulfilling their safe housing mandate. Part II
of this Note examines Doe, providing information on the parties involved and
the particular lease provisions questioned. Part II also expounds on the court’s
analysis of the constitutional question. Part III analyzes the Doe decision in
light of judicial review and public policy considerations. This Note concludes
by arguing that the common area caveat embodied in the Doe decision stands
as a model firearms policy for public housing authorities. A policy that allows
firearms within the individual unit, but prohibits firearms in common areas,
allows housing authorities to strike a paradigmatic balance between fulfilling
their mandate to provide safe housing to their tenants and respecting the
individual right to bear arms.
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES: AN
OVERVIEW
A. Second Amendment Jurisprudence from the Founders to the Twenty-First
Century
The Second Amendment states, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed.”27 Prior to 2008, the predominant, long-standing
interpretation of this language was that the Second Amendment only protected
the right to bear arms related to military purposes (militia interpretation).28 At

27. U.S, CONST. amend. II. The Second Amendment is generally understood to be
composed of two distinct clauses. CHARLES, supra note 1, at 5. The first part, “[a] well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” is the prefatory clause; the second part,
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed,” is the operative clause. Id.;
see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–98 (2008) (explaining the difference
between the two clauses).
28. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (reasoning that the Second Amendment
was only meant to be applied to the right to bear arms related to militia use); Presser v. Illinois,
116 U.S. 252 (1886) (reaffirming Cruikshank and stating that states cannot restrict the federal
government’s ability to maintain national security); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
553 (1875) (holding that the Second Amendment does not grant a right to bear arms, but rather is
meant to limit the power of the national government and allow for a militia); STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1
(2008) (noting that the long-standing interpretation of the Second Amendment was “that
individuals have a right to possess and carry firearms and that an armed populace constitutes a
militia”); SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 84 (“For most of U.S. history, the law of
the Second Amendment has been a settled matter, in that the amendment has been understood by
the courts as pertaining only to citizen service in a government-organized and regulated militia.”).
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first, legal scholars generally agreed with the militia interpretation.29 However,
in 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller that a D.C.
ban on handguns was a violation of the Second Amendment, and further, that
the Second Amendment protects the individual right to bear arms, unconnected
to military service (individual right interpretation).30 As revolutionary as the
Heller decision is, the Supreme Court was not yet finished redefining the scope
of the Second Amendment. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court extended the Heller analysis to individual states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The following discussion
provides an overview of this bifurcation in Second Amendment jurisprudence.
1. The Supreme Court and the Militia Interpretation of the Second
Amendment
A series of three Supreme Court cases—United States v. Cruikshank (1876),
Presser v. Illinois (1886), and United States v. Miller (1939)—provide the
foundation for the previously dominant militia interpretation of the Second
Amendment.32 In Cruikshank, the Court addressed Section Six of the
Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 (the Enforcement Act),33 which made it a
felony “to prevent or hinder [the] free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to [a person] by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.”34 The defendants in Cruikshank were charged with eight
29. See Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical
Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 10, at 146
(claiming that the basic purpose of the Second Amendment was to “prevent[] Congress from
abolishing the organized, well-regulated militias of the states”); Steven J. Heyman, Natural
Rights and the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra
note 10, at 206 (concluding that the Second Amendment secured a “collective” right, and that
“[i]f the Supreme Court were to read an individual right to arms into the Second Amendment, the
result would be precisely the opposite of what the founders intended: to entrust the use and
regulation of force to the community as a whole”); WINKLER, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that
the reasoning behind the militia theory was a concern that the federal government would be too
powerful; therefore the Second Amendment was needed to ensure that the government could not
disarm local militias, which were thought to protect the people as a whole).
30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) (explaining additionally
that “it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct”).
31. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that Heller also
applied to States).
32. See SPITZER, Lost and Found, supra note 10, at 17 (explaining that the Supreme Court
addressed issues relating to the Second Amendment in Cruikshank, Presser, Miller v. Texas, and
United States v. Miller and consistently applied the militia interpretation of the Second
Amendment). Miller v. Texas simply reaffirmed the Court’s holding in Cruikshank and as such is
not provided in-depth treatment in this Note. See 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (refusing to extend
application of the Second and Fourth Amendments to the States).
33. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.
34. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (repealed 1910). The
Enforcement Act generally guaranteed that all citizens were allowed to vote, regardless of “race,
color, or previous servitude.” Id. at § 1.
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counts of “banding” and “conspiring” for interfering with the rights of two
African American men, including the right to vote and the right to bear arms.35
The Court held that the right to bear arms “is not a right granted by the
Constitution” and that the Second Amendment “has no other effect than to
restrict the powers of the national government.”36 In other words, the
Cruikshank court held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the
States.37
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court added another dimension to the
Second Amendment’s application to the states in Presser v. Illinois.38 In
Presser, the plaintiff claimed that his criminal indictment under Article Eleven
of the Illinois Military Code (IMC) was void because the statute under which
he was convicted was unconstitutional.39 The statute at issue prohibited a
group of men from performing military drills with weapons in public, unless
they had a valid license to do so.40 The plaintiff argued that the relevant IMC
section violated the Second Amendment.41 The Court, however, disagreed and
reaffirmed its holding in Cruikshank that the Second Amendment was “a
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government.”42
The Presser Court added, however, that it is necessary to allow citizens to bear
arms as members of militias, because they are essential for national security.43

35. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548. Cruikshank was “the first Supreme Court case to give the
Second Amendment any significant attention.” CHARLES, supra note 1, at 64 (2009).
36. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. The Court further stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
only “prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws; but . . . does not . . . add any thing to the rights which one citizen has under the
Constitution against another.” Id. at 554–55. In 1894, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
Cruikshank holding in Miller v. State of Texas. 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894). In Miller, the Court
addressed whether a Texas statute prohibiting the carrying of weapons violated the Second
Amendment. Id. The Court held it as “well settled” that Second Amendment restrictions
“operate only upon the Federal power;” therefore, such restrictions are not implicated in state
proceedings. Id.; see also SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 35 (discussing Miller
and noting that “[a]gain, the Court said that the right to bear arms did not apply to the states”).
37. See SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 33 (explaining the two principles
established by Cruikshank: “first, that the Second Amendment poses no obstacle to at least some
regulation of firearms; and second, that the Second Amendment is not incorporated, meaning that
it pertains only to federal power, not state power.”).
38. 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
39. Id. at 260–61.
40. Id. at 253 (Woods, J., Statement of Facts).
41. Id. at 260.
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id. (explaining that “all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military
force . . . and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general
powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view,
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms,” as it is necessary for national security);
SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 34–35 (highlighting that Presser reaffirmed the
militia interpretation of the Second Amendment).
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In United States v. Miller, the Court considered whether Section Eleven of
the National Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment.44 Section 11
required that firearms shipped, carried, or delivered in interstate commerce be
registered and have a “stamp-affixed order.”45 The defendants were charged
with violating Section 11 by transporting a double-barrelled shotgun across
state lines.46 In upholding the charges, the Court stated, “we cannot say that
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.”47 The Court reasoned that the government did not show that the
shotgun had a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia.”48 The Court explained that the Second Amendment
was intended to ensure that an effective militia would always be in place
throughout the United States.49 Stated differently, the Court found that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms was specifically limited to bearing arms
for military purpose.50
Thus, prior to 2008, Supreme Court jurisprudence firmly established that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms only restricts the federal government
and is only implicated with regards to military service.51 State court decisions
decided prior to 2008 paralleled the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Second Amendment.52
44. 307 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1939).
45. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, § 11, 48 Stat. 1236, 1239 (1934) (repealed Oct. 22,
1968).
46. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked to address the
constitutionality of a village ordinance prohibiting handgun possession within village borders.
Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1982). The court relied on United
States v. Miller in holding that the Second Amendment right to bear arms was “inextricably
connected to the preservation of a militia.” Id. at 270.
49. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment
were made.”); see also SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 36 (highlighting the Court’s
message that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to maintain a militia).
50. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; see SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 36 (stating
that under Miller, “citizens could only possess a constitutional right to bear arms in connection
with service in a militia”).
51. See supra notes 31–50 and accompanying text. For an interesting argument against the
militia-only restriction, see HALBROOK, supra note 28, at 333 (arguing that militias are obsolete
today because of the existence of a standing army, but asserting that there is a right to bear arms
because the second clause of the Second Amendment is not conditional on the first).
52. See Michael A. Bellesiles, The Second Amendment in Action, in THE SECOND
AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 10, at 71–72 (discussing how state courts
consistently applied the militia theory in Second Amendment cases). Until the McDonald
decision in 2010, lower courts understood that, under Supreme Court precedent, the Second
Amendment restricted only the federal government from infringing upon the right to bear arms
related to military use. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (applying
the Second Amendment to the States). Operating with this understanding, legislatures
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2. Heller and McDonald: A Reversal in Second Amendment Jurisprudence
Prior to Heller, it was noted that although, “the political significance of the
Second Amendment is great; the legal significance of the Second Amendment
is small.”53 This sentiment was due in large part to the general consensus,
discussed infra, that the Second Amendment was settled law and “generated
relatively little constitutional law.”54 Second Amendment interpretation did
not become a controversial issue until the late twentieth century, having been
“[f]or much of American history . . . a bedrock constitutional principle.” 55 The
more recent debate over the merits of the individual right interpretation versus
the militia interpretation in Second Amendment jurisprudence is arguably due
to the predominant (and widely accepted) criticism of the individual right
interpretation as being contrary to the Founders’ intent and Supreme Court
decisions,56 and that the interpretation grants an unnecessary “constitutional
protection.”57 Robert J. Spitzer noted in 2001 that, “the concerns that gave rise
consistently passed firearms regulations that went unchallenged. Bellesiles, supra, at 71
(“Legislatures . . . worked on the assumption that they had a legitimate interest in passing acts to
secure the public safety. As a consequence, measures that placed precise limitations on the use
and possession of firearms passed largely unchallenged.”); cf. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2
Hum.) 154, 156, 159 (1840) (holding that an article of the Tennessee Constitution that is similar
to the Second Amendment only protected weapons used for “civil warfare” or “the common
defence”); see also Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction in GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION
SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at xix (noting how
the ideas developed in Aymette that (1) there is a difference between a carrying a concealed
weapon and openly carrying a weapon and (2) that there are distinctions between weapon types,
which make some “suitable for the common defense, while others are not” (“the civilized-warfare
test”), have played an important role in cases addressing the right to bear arms). A shift in
jurisprudence away from the militia interpretation began in 2001 with the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 210–12 (5th Cir. 2001). In Emerson, the defendant
challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) as “unconstitutional on its face
under the Second Amendment.” Id. (the Court examined a motion to dismiss an indictment
against the defendant that charged him with possession of a firearm in violation of a court order
prohibiting such possession). The Emerson court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in
Miller as neither supporting the militia interpretation nor the individual rights interpretation of the
Second Amendment. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 224–27. Rather, the Emerson court held that the
Second Amendment “protects the right of individuals, including those not then actually a member
of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to privately possess and bear their
own firearms.” Id. at 260. In hindsight, the Emerson decision was likely an indicator of the
growing popularity of the individual rights interpretation and a precursor to the Heller-McDonald
decisions. See SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 113 (noting that the Second
Amendment reemerged in the courts in Emerson).
53. SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 4.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Cottrol, supra note 52, at xi.
56. See supra Part I.A.1. and accompanying notes.
57. See Finkelman, supra note 29, at 146 (emphasizing that “[t]he Second Amendment does
not protect the individual right to hunt deer, collect antique weapons, go to the firing range, or
even own a licensed pistol,” because constitutional protection was not needed for these activities
at the time the Bill of Rights was written, “and it is not needed today”); see also HALBROOK,
supra note 28, at 177–78 (quoting Noah Webster, a contemporary of James Madison and
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to the Second Amendment evaporated as reality changed—that is, as the
country turned away from unorganized or general citizen militias, the Second
Amendment was rendered obsolete.”58 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller
resurrected Second Amendment jurisprudence and reignited the controversy
over how the Amendment should be interpreted.
a. District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment as an
Individual Right
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court considered a Second
Amendment challenge to a District of Columbia law prohibiting handguns in
the home.59 The respondent, Dick Heller, was a D.C. special police officer
who was refused registration for a personal handgun intended for home use.60
Heller wanted a handgun for personal use to protect himself from criminals
who frequented an abandoned public housing project across the street from his
home.61 Heller argued that the Second Amendment’s protection is not limited
to militia service, but rather provides for the individual right to bear arms for
lawful purposes.62 The petitioners, however, contended that the Second
Amendment’s protection was limited to militia service.63
In reaching a decision in Heller, the Court first analyzed the plain meaning
of the text of the Second Amendment.64 The Heller Court made two important
findings regarding the language of the Second Amendment. First, the Court
found that the operative clause of the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”65
Second, the Court found that although the prefatory clause does establish that
one purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that an effective militia was in
place, it “does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason” for
Alexander Hamilton, who contended that providing a right to arms provision in the Constitution
was as absurd as provisions that restricted Congress from passing laws that regulated how
Americans ate or slept); SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 59 (“The Second
Amendment is simply unnecessary as a legal protection for personal defense or defense of the
home today, just as it was two centuries ago. Indeed, as defined in the common law tradition, the
self-defense principle supersedes even constitutional guidelines.”).
58. SPITZER, Right to Bear Arms, supra note 8, at 41.
59. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
60. Id. at 575.
61. WINKLER, supra note 2, at 41–42. Heller lived across the street from Kentucky Courts,
a former public housing project run by the D.C. Department of Public and Assisted Housing. Id.
Although Kentucky Courts was closed in 1997, it “remained a haven for drug addicts and
dealers.” Id. Heller felt unsafe in the neighborhood and, once, even found a stray bullet fired
into his front door. Id.
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (2008).
63. Id. (arguing that the Second Amendment “protects only the right to possess and carry a
firearm in connection with militia service” (internal citations omitted)).
64. Id. at 576–98 (presenting a thorough analysis of both the operative and prefatory clauses
of the Second Amendment).
65. Id. at 592.
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the right.66 The Court concluded that the reference to a “right of the people” in
the Second Amendment provides a “strong presumption that the Second
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”67
The Court further concluded that there was no evidence that the reference to
bearing arms “bore a military meaning.”68
The Court also conducted a historic review of the Second Amendment to
confirm the individual right interpretation.69 The Court first reviewed
provisions in state constitutions dealing with the right to bear arms that were
passed at the same time as the Second Amendment.70 The Court also surveyed
various interpretations of the Second Amendment, beginning with the
Amendment’s passage and through the end of the nineteenth century.71 On the
basis of this detailed analysis, the Court concluded that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms separate from and
unrelated to militia services.72
The Heller Court also considered its own precedent in Cruikshank, Presser,
and Miller, and concluded that its interpretation of the Second Amendment in
the instant case was consistent with precedent.73 First, the Court explained that
its decision in Cruikshank supported the individual right interpretation because
the Court’s description of the Second Amendment right as “‘bearing arms for a
lawful purpose’” does not make much sense if exercise of the right is limited to
members of the militia.74 Then the Court considered its holding in Presser,
finding that Presser “said nothing about the Second Amendment’s meaning or
scope” and therefore did not limit the Court’s ability to interpret these
matters.75 Finally, the Court qualified its prior holding in Miller,76 finding that
the holding was not based on the right to bear arms for military versus

66. Id. at 595, 599.
67. Id. at 579–81 (explaining that interpreting the Second Amendment as only applying to
militias fails to recognize that “the people” hold the right to bear arms).
68. Id. at 591.
69. See id. at 592–95 (presenting examples of the individualist view of the right to bear
arms from both British and American history). The majority’s interpretation of historic evidence
has been criticized as “a conservative stance” that “repressed, ignored, or referred to as
erroneous” all evidence that did not support the individual right theory. CHARLES, supra note 1,
at 6–7.
70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 600–03.
71. Id. at 605–19.
72. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the
home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”)
73. Id. at 619–26.
74. Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)).
75. Id. at 620–21. Critics argued that by dismissing Presser, “the Heller majority missed
the larger point” of the case—that the right to bear arms was a militia right. CHARLES, supra note
1, at 67–68.
76. Heller, 554 U.S. at 621–25.
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non-military purposes, but rather was based on “the type of weapon at issue.” 77
As such, the Court explained that Miller “stands only for the proposition that
the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types
of weapons.”78
In concluding that existing precedent did not foreclose the individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia stated that “[i]t should
be unsurprising that such a significant matter has been for so long judicially
unresolved” because “[f]or most of our history the question did not present
itself.”79 It would only be two years until the Court applied this new
interpretation of the Second Amendment to the states.80
b. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment as a Restriction
on State and Local Authority
In response to the Court’s holding in Heller, four petitioners challenged a
Chicago ordinance that effectively banned private handgun possession within
the Chicago city limits.81 The petitioners challenged the ordinance as a
violation of their Second Amendment rights and, in agreement, the Court
extended Heller to apply to state and local governments.82 The legal question
in McDonald was whether the Second Amendment applied to the individual
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.83 That question, in turn, required
determining “whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty”84 or “whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.’”85 Justice Alito concluded that the right to

77. Id. at 622–23.
78. Id. The Court’s characterization of Miller thusly has been criticized as “infer[ring]
something from a court opinion that is not there.” CHARLES, supra note 1, at 68. Charles argues,
that at no point does the Miller opinion refer “to ‘lawful purposes’ or to the use of firearms for
civilian purposes.” Id.
79. Id. at 625–26.
80. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the
Second Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
81. Id. (the Chicago city ordinance required handgun owners to register their handguns, but
simultaneously prohibited the registration of most handguns). It is not surprising that Chicago’s
ordinance was the next Second Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court because “Chicago
was the only major city to follow D.C.’s lead on banning handguns.” WINKLER, supra note 2, at
42.
82. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. Justice Alito, using language similar to that used by
Justice Scalia in Heller, stated that the Court had “never previously addressed the question
whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States” applying the Due Process Clause’s
“selective incorporation” theory. Id. at 3031.
83. Id. at 3036.
84. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
85. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, and as such, should be applied to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
As evidenced by Heller and McDonald, the Court all but abandoned the
militia interpretation of the Second Amendment and abruptly replaced it with
the individual right interpretation.87 The Court’s holdings mean that an
individual, unrelated to any participation in militia services, has a right to bear
arms, which is protected against encroachment by federal, state, and local
government.88
c.

Lower Courts Confront the Heller-McDonald Aftermath

Heller and McDonald are landmark decisions in Second Amendment
jurisprudence.89 As notable as they may be, they do not provide a clear path
for the lower courts to follow in deciding the legitimacy of gun restrictions.90
Arguably the most important question left unanswered is what level of scrutiny
to apply when gun laws are challenged.91 Without guidance from the Court,
lower courts have addressed Second Amendment cases cautiously and
practically, favoring an “interest-balancing approach” and applying
intermediate scrutiny.92
Since the Heller and McDonald decisions were issued, circuit courts have
developed various approaches to applying intermediate level scrutiny in

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 3042, 3050.
See supra Part I.A.2.a and I.A.2.b and accompanying notes.
See supra notes 72, 79, & 86.
Rostron, supra note 17, at 704–05.
Id. (noting that the Court’s decisions “left important questions unanswered”); see also
CHARLES, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that the Heller decision did not specify how the holding
should be applied by lower courts).
91. Rostron, supra note 17, at 705. Courts generally choose from three levels of scrutiny in
evaluating constitutional claims: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Sarah
Perkins, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA.
L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2010). Rational basis is the most deferential standard of review and is the
form of judicial analysis applied when the statute in question “does not implicate a fundamental
right or a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (9th ed. 2009). Under this standard of review, “the
court will uphold a law if it bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate
governmental objective.” Id. Intermediate scrutiny, or heightened scrutiny, is the standard of
review applied when “a statute contains a quasi-suspect classification (such as gender or
legitimacy).” Id. at 890. For a statute to be upheld under intermediate scrutiny, “the
classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective.” Id. Strict scrutiny is the most demanding level of scrutiny and is “[t]he standard
applied to suspect classifications (such as race) in equal protection analysis and to fundamental
rights (such as voting rights) in due-process analysis. Id. at 1558. To meet this standard, “the
state must establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates the law in
question.” Id.
92. Rostron, supra note 17, at 706–07.
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Second Amendment cases.93 In United States v. Marzzarella, the Third Circuit
addressed whether a “conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) for possession of a
handgun with an obliterated serial number” violates the Second Amendment.94
In addressing this question in light of Heller, the Marzzarella court applied a
two-pronged test.95 The first prong of the Marzzarella test asks “whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment’s guarantee.”96 If the conduct in question does not fall
within the scope of the Second Amendment, further analysis is unnecessary.97
If, however, the conduct does fall within the Second Amendment’s guarantee,
then the court must apply “some form of means-end scrutiny.”98 Under this
second prong, if the challenged law meets the particular level of scrutiny
applied, then it is upheld if it fails to meet the level of scrutiny, the law is
invalid as a violation of the Second Amendment.99
Applying the first prong, the Marzzarella court asked whether Section
922(k) regulates conduct protected by the Second Amendment.100 First, the
court noted that while Heller provided examples of lawful gun regulations, the
list was not exhaustive, leaving room for court interpretation.101 For example,
the list did not include prohibitions on the possession of guns with altered or
obliterated serial numbers, as codified under Section 922(k).102 Furthermore,
the court noted that Marzzarella kept the firearm in his home, “implicat[ing]
his interest in the defense of hearth and home—the core protection of the
Second Amendment.”103 Because the court could not “be certain that the
possession of unmarked firearms in the home is excluded from the right to bear
arms,” the court assumed that Section 922(k) burdened conduct protected by
the Second Amendment and moved to the second prong of the Marzzarella
test.104
93. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 608 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying “heightened
constitutional scrutiny” to Second Amendment challenges and using the Marzzarella court’s two
-pronged approach); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopting a
two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,
641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to categorical limits on permitted firearm
ownership).
94. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 87.
95. Id. at 89.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (identifying the threshold inquiry as “whether the possession of an unmarked firearm
in the home is protected by the right to bear arms”).
101. Id. at 92–93.
102. Id. at 93.
103. Id. at 94.
104. Id. at 95. The court, however, emphasized that it was only deciding whether the statute
at issue passed constitutional muster, not whether Marzzarella’s possession of the unmarked
firearm in his home was actually protected under the Second Amendment. Id. at 101.
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With respect to the second prong of the Marzzarella test, the government
argued for applying the rational basis test, but the court readily dismissed that
argument, citing Heller’s rejection of the test in Second Amendment
challenges.105 The defendant urged the court to apply strict scrutiny,
contending that, “the right to bear arms is an enumerated fundamental
constitutional right.”106 The court also rejected that argument, reasoning that
strict scrutiny should only apply to those laws that “severely limit the
possession of firearms,” such as the ban overruled in Heller.107 In contrast,
Section 922(k) merely regulates the possession of handguns.108 An individual
“is free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm he chooses—so long as it bears
its original serial number.”109 Given this distinction, the Marzzarella court
concluded that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the challenged
law.110
The Marzzarella court upheld the defendant’s conviction under Section
922(k), concluding that the statute passed intermediate scrutiny.111 First, the
court concluded that Section 922(k) serves an important government interest
by enabling law enforcement to trace firearms via their serial numbers.112
Then the court stated that it could not “conceive of a lawful purpose for which
a person would prefer an unmarked firearm.”113 Accordingly, the court
concluded that “[r]egulating the possession of unmarked firearms . . . fits
closely with the interest in ensuring the traceability of weapons.”114
In United States v. Chester, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violates the individual right to bear
arms protected by Second Amendment.115 The Chester court noted that under
Heller, “the Second Amendment ‘was not unlimited’”; instead “[it] protected
only weapons ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.’”116 The Chester court further explained that because the Heller
Court rejected rational basis scrutiny, “heightened constitutional scrutiny”
should be applied.117 The Fourth Circuit then looked to the Third Circuit’s
105. Id. at 95–96 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008)).
106. Id. at 96.
107. Id. at 97 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29).
108. Id.
109. Id. Under Section 922(k), an individual is “free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm
he chooses—so long as it bears the original serial number.” Id.
110. Id. at 97.
111. Id. at 99.
112. Id. at 98.
113. Id. at 99.
114. Id.
115. 628 F.3d 673, 674 (4th Cir. 2010). Chester was indicted for possession of a firearm
three years after being convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault and battery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Id. at 677.
116. Id. at 678 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 625 (2008)).
117. Id. at 679–80.
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two-pronged test for Second Amendment claims, as laid out in Marzzarella.118
Because Section 922(g)(9) prevents an entire class of persons from owning
firearms indefinitely, the Chester court reasoned that applying the first prong
of the Marzzarella test required determining if those who had committed a
misdemeanor domestic violence offense were unprotected by the Second
Amendment.119 Because the federal government did not take that position, the
court assumed that the Second Amendment protected the defendant to some
extent.120
The Chester court then addressed the second prong by “applying an
appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.”121 The Chester court noted that
Heller did not specify what level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment
challenged, except to say that something more than rational basis review was
required.122 The court refused to apply strict scrutiny to the statute, dismissing
Chester’s argument that the statute “burdens an enumerated, fundamental
right” as being “too broad.”123 The court further reasoned that the defendant
did not fall within the beneficiaries of “the core right identified in Heller—the
right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for
self-defense—by virtue of [his] criminal history as a domestic violence
misdemeanant.”124 The Chester court concluded that intermediate scrutiny
should apply and, as such, the government had to show a reasonable relation
between the challenged law and the important government interest the law is
meant to promote.125 The court explained that although the government
“offered numerous plausible reasons” for why disarmament of the targeted
offenders was substantially related to the government objective, it had failed
“to offer sufficient evidence” establishing such substantial relationship.126
Therefore, the court held that the government failed to meet its burden of proof
under intermediate level scrutiny.127 The case was remanded to the district
court to allow the government the opportunity to meet its burden.128
In United States v. Skoien, the Seventh Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
the same statute at issue in Chester, which prohibited those convicted of a
misdemeanor domestic violence crime from carrying firearms.129 The
118. Id. at 680.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 681.
121. Id. at 682.
122. Id.
123. Id. (explaining that “[i]n the analogous First Amendment context, the level of scrutiny
we apply depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the
challenged law burdens the right”).
124. Id. at 682–83 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 614 F.3d 638, 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2010).
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defendant, Steven Skoien, who had two prior domestic violence convictions,
was found with three firearms in his possession, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9).130 In deciding Skoien, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question
of “whether Congress is entitled to adopt categorical disqualifications [for
carrying firearms] such as § 922(g)(9).”131
The Skoien court first noted that although Heller created an individual right
to keep “operable handguns at home for self-defense,” questions, such as the
one the court faced, were left unanswered.132 Because the statute places “a
categorical limit on the possession of firearms,” the court explained that it must
be subject to more than rational basis review.133 Rather, a stricter test applies;
there must be a “substantial relation” between the categorical limit and the
objective to be achieved by such limit.134 In applying intermediate scrutiny,
the Skoien court identified the “underpinning” of Section 922(g)(9) as the
belief that those “who have been convicted of violence once—toward a spouse,
child, or domestic partner, no less—are likely to use violence again.”135 The
Skoien court then held that this underpinning justified preventing the targeted
offenders from possessing firearms, undoubtedly an important government
objective to which the statute is substantially related.136
The cases decided thus far generally agree on applying intermediate scrutiny
to Second Amendment challenges. This consensus, however, is tempered by
the fact that only three years have passed since the Supreme Court decided
McDonald.137 As other Second Amendment challenges pass through the
courts, legislatures, local governments, and other government-related entities
must work within this limited body of law.
B. Housing Authorities and the Second Amendment
The United States Housing Act of 1937 (the 1937 Act) mandates that public
housing authorities provide safe housing to all of their tenants.138
Understandably, this mandate occasionally conflicts with “the uniquely strong
attachment” the United States has to guns.139 This attachment is evidenced
130. Id. at 639. Mr. Skoien was sentenced to two years in prison. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 640.
133. Id. at 641.
134. Id. at 641–42.
135. Id. at 642.
136. Id. at 642–45.
137. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2006) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to assist States
and political subdivisions of States to remedy the unsafe housing conditions and the acute
shortage of decent and safe dwellings for low-income families”); 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(14)
(2006) (requiring public housing agencies to establish a “safety and crime prevention” plan).
139. See SPITZER, supra note 8, at 2 (suggesting that America’s attachment to guns is
preventing stricter gun laws).
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both by the number of firearms currently owned by U.S. residents—an
estimated three hundred million140—and by the fact that “the United States
consistently maintains the highest per capita rate of gun deaths of any
industrialized nation.”141 As of 2010, public housing authorities in the United
States provided residencies for more than one million households.142 Thus,
gun control and gun-related crime are issues that housing authorities must
directly address.143
Public housing authorities are created through state enabling statutes144 and
are uniquely governed by the interplay of federal, state, and local
regulations.145 The largest public housing authorities are generally situated in
highly populated cities in the United States.146 The most populated cities in the
140. James D. Agresti & Reid K. Smith, Gun Control Facts, JUST FACTS, (last revised Feb.
11, 2013), http://www.justfacts.com/guncontrol.asp (estimating in 2010 that 300 million firearms
were currently owned in the United States); Amy Roberts, By the Numbers: Guns in America
CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/politics/btn-guns-in
-america/index.html (stating that as of 2009, there were 310 million nonmilitary firearms in the
United States).
141. SPITZER, supra note 8, at 2.
142. Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment Under a Government Landlord: Is There a
Right to Keep and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995, 998
(2010).
143. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 19, at 29–30 (noting that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development has the responsibility of “ensur[ing] that
residents of communities receive the necessary support to eliminate gun violence in their
neighborhoods”). Since the 1990s, “housing assistance in the United States has undergone a
profound transformation.” Susan J. Popkin et al., Public Housing Transformation and Crime:
Making the Case for Responsible Relocation, 14 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 137, 139
(2012). The rationale behind the changes was that replacing distressed public housing
developments with combination mixed-income communities would allow public housing
residents to “benefit both socially and economically from living in more diverse, higher
-opportunity neighborhoods.” Id.
144. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 34201(c), 34242 (West 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 8-3–4 (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1–10/3 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. § 12-103 et. seq. (LexisNexis 2006).
145. Brief for Amicus Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendants at 10, Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 513 (D. Del.
2012) (C.A. No. 10-0473-LPS), cert. granted (De. July 30, 2013) (No. 403, 2013) (noting that
housing authorities “are governed by a unique combination of federal, state, and local
regulations” and are “[j]ointly overseen by HUD, state and local authorities”). For example, the
Wilmington Housing Authority is subject to the provisions of the 1937 Housing Act, the
Delaware Housing Law, and the Wilmington City Code of Ordinances. See Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d
at 518, 535 (finding that the Wilmington Housing Authority was created pursuant to title 31,
section 4303, and that the Authority is subject to federal mandates, including the mandate to
create safety plans under 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(14)(A)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4302 (2009)
(providing for the creation of public housing authorities to provide safe housing in the State).
146. The Council of Large Public Housing Authorities (CLPHA) is a non-profit organization
composed of housing authorities in almost every major metropolitan area in the United States.
About CLPHA, http://clpha.org/about. CLPHA membership is restricted to large public housing
authorities, defined as those “public housing authorities that administer more than 1,200
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United States have the highest crime rates.147 As such, public housing
residents continue to face higher rates of crime and gun-related violence than
other populations.148 In 2000, the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) released a report detailing their study of gun
violence in public housing.149 The report found that public housing residents
“are over twice as likely to suffer from firearm-related victimization as other
members of the population.”150 In 1998, there were approximately 360 gun
-related homicides in sixty-six of the largest public housing authorities in the
United States.151
Despite these statistics, HUD does not have an official policy regarding the
right to bear arms in public housing.152 The Heller and McDonald decisions
combined
units
and
vouchers.”
Become
a
CLPHA
Member,
CLPHA,
http://clpha.org/becomeaclphamember (last viewed Aug. 8, 2013). CLPHA members include the
Atlanta Housing Authority, Baltimore City Housing Authority, Chicago Housing Authority,
District of Columbia Housing Authority, Houston Housing Authority, Los Angeles City Housing
Authority, New York City Housing Authority, Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority,
and San Francisco Housing Authority. CLPHA Member Directory, CLPHA, http://clpha.
org/memberdirectory (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
147. See Uniform Crime Reports: Table 2 Crime in the United States by Community Type,
2011, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-2 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) (reporting that metropolitan
areas had the highest rate of violent crime in 2011, with a rate of 410.3 violent crimes per 100,000
inhabitants compared to 186.1 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in nonmetropolitan cities).
148. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 18, at 2, 5, 18 (highlighting the
report’s findings that gun violence is a serious problem in public housing, not only in cities, but
also in small and medium-sized metropolitan areas, which “experienced rates of gun violence
similar to those in larger metropolitan areas”); see also Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, supra note 145, at 13, (acknowledging that
“[g]un violence has and continues to pose a unique threat to public housing residents”).
149. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that the report
provides “the first-ever comprehensive analysis of gun-related violence in public housing
communities”).
150. Id. at 2, 14 (finding that between 1995 and 1997 the rate of gun victimization was 4 per
1,000 among persons not in public housing, compared to 10 per 1,000 among person in public
housing). The study also found that guns cause significant financial damage. Id. at 2, 21 (noting
that public housing authorities have spent more than four billion dollars since 1990 on crime
reduction and prevention efforts).
151. Id. at 15. Among these sixty-six housing authorities were the Chicago Housing
Authority, District of Columbia Housing Authority, Los Angeles Housing Authority, and New
York City Housing Authority. Id. at 16.
152. Wershbale, supra note 142, at 1013–14; see U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 189 (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov
/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf (stating that a provision regarding weapon
possession is option in public housing authority leases). The fact that public housing only serves
lower-income individuals helps to explain the lack of an official policy regarding firearms, as
such a policy could be considered discriminatory. The Doe plaintiffs adopted this argument in
their amended complaint:
Wealthier persons who live in another type of government housing are not deprived of
the right to keep and bear arms. Similarly, people who can afford to live in private
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provide public housing authorities a baseline from which to draft or amend
their firearms policies, but confusion remains about how to appropriately
implement the policies.153 These decisions present a confusing baseline for
public housing authorities because public housing developments are “both
government-owned buildings and citizen dwellings.”154 In the twenty years
before Heller, very few cases dealt with public housing firearms policies.155 In
the four years since Heller, at least three cases aside from Doe have been
filed.156 As the only case that has been decided on the merits, Doe presents an
housing are not deprived of this right. Defendants’ above-described deprivation of
Plaintiff’s civil rights under color of law has been and continues to be intentional,
ongoing and in a discriminatory manner, based (at minimum) upon Plaintiff’s economic
and/or social status.
Second Amended Complaint at 4–5, Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F.Supp.2d 513
(D. Del. 2012) appeal docketed 12–3433 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (CA No. 10-0473-LPS), cert.
granted (De. July 30, 2013) (No. 403,2013). The argument that racism and disproportionate
discrimination underlie firearms policies and gun control laws is not novel. See, e.g., Stefan B.
Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 67, 67–68 (1991) (discussing
the prejudices behind the enactment of gun laws, such as the notion that African-Americans and
poor people should not be trusted with guns); Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun
Control, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1995, at 17(1995) (arguing that history shows
“compelling evidence that racism underlies gun control laws”).
153. See Wershbale, supra note 140, at 995–96 (explaining that while Heller and McDonald
helped to articulate the right to bear arms, gun regulation remains a complicated issue,
particularly in the public housing setting).
154. Id. at 1033–34 (explaining that Heller and McDonald did not strictly preclude firearm
regulation in public housing, but the regulation permitted depends on the property involved).
155. See, e.g., Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth., 751 F.
Supp. 1204, 1206–07 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27694 (4th Cir. 1991)
(upholding as reasonable a lease provision that prohibited the possession of certain types of
weapon, but concluding that a clause prohibiting “any weapon of any type” was too broad); Doe
v. Portland Hous. Auth., 656 A.2d 1200, 1201, 1204 (Me. 1995) (declaring that a housing
authority lease provision prohibiting tenants from possessing firearms on public housing property
was preempted by a state law regulating restrictions on firearms); Lincoln Park Hous. Comm’n v.
Andrew, No. 244259, 2004 WL 576260, at *1, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2004) (per curiam)
(affirming an eviction based on violation of a lease agreement that prohibited firearms on the
housing authority property, holding that defendant had failed to show that the firearms prohibition
was not substantially related “to the health, safety and general welfare” of public housing
tenants); Wershbale, supra note 142, at 1034 (stating that in 2010, “[p]ublic housing firearm bans
have not recently been challenged in a substantial manner”).
156. For example, only one day after Heller was decided, the National Rifle Association
(NRA) filed a lawsuit against the San Francisco Housing Authority arguing that a lease provision
that prohibited the possession of firearms on housing authority property violated the for Second
and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. S. F.
Hous. Auth., No. 3:08-cv-03112-TEH (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2008). The San Francisco Housing
Authority, and the John Stewart Company, the housing authority’s property manager,
subsequently settled the lawsuit by agreeing to amend the firearms policy to apply only to “the
unlawful ownership, unlawful possession, unlawful transportation, or unlawful use of firearms
and/or ammunition.” Stipulation re Settlement and Dismissal Without Prejudice at 2–3, Doe, No.
3:08-cv-03112-TEH. A lawsuit was filed in 2011 against the District of Columbia Housing
Authority based on a lease provision that prohibited “storing, maintaining, using, distributing,
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important threshold discussion and analysis of Second Amendment
jurisprudence, specifically, safety on public housing property.157
II. DOE V. WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY
A workable and effective gun control policy on housing authority property is
an integral part of providing the “safe housing” for housing authority tenants
that is mandated by the 1937 Act.158 On May 26, 2010, a suit was filed against
the Wilmington Housing Authority (WHA) challenging a firearms policy that
strictly prohibited residents and members or guests of residents from
possessing firearms on housing authority property.159 WHA subsequently
purchasing or selling” firearms on public housing authority property. Complaint at 2–3, Scott v.
D.C. Hous. Auth., No. 1:11-cv-01342-GK (D.D.C. July 22, 2011). The lawsuit was dismissed in
February 2012. Notice of Dismissal, Scott, No. 1:11-cv-01342-GK. The NRA reported that the
suit was dismissed after the housing authority agreed to change the lease provision to allow for
lawful gun possession. NRA-ILA Legal Update–March 2012, NRA-ILA: INSTITUTE FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/legal/nra-ila-legal-update/nra-ila
-legal-update-march-2012.aspx. In April of 2012, a lawsuit was filed against the Warren County
Housing Authority based on a lease provision that prohibits “any member of the household, a
guest, or another person under the Resident’s control to use, possess, or have control over
firearms.” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 1, 4, Winbigler v. Warren County
Hous. Auth., No. 4:12-cv-04032-SLD-JAG (C.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2012). The trial in Winbigler is
currently set for November 18, 2013. Minute Entry for Proceedings Held Before Mag. J. John A.
Gorman, Winbigler, No. 4:12-cv-04032-SLD-JAG.
157. See Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F.Supp.2d 513, 535–37 (D. Del. 2012), appeal
docketed No. 12-3433 (3d. Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (C.A. No. 1:10-00473-LPS), cert. granted (De.
July 30, 2013) (No. 403,2013) (determining that WHA’s Revised Policy to limit the right to bear
arms in common areas had to be evaluated using intermediate scrutiny and finding that the
common area provision reasonably fit the WHA’s interest in protecting the safety of its residents).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(14) (2006) (outlining the requirement that Public Housing
Authorities have a comprehensive safety plan in place).
159. Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880
F.Supp.2d 513 (D. Del. 2012), (C.A. No. 1:10-00473-LPS), cert. granted (De. July 30, 2013)
(No. 403,2013). The WHA lease provision at issue stated that residents were “not to display, use,
or possess or allow members of Resident’s household or guests to display, use or possess any
firearms, (operable or inoperable) or other dangerous instruments or deadly weapons as defined
by the laws of the State of Delaware anywhere on the property of the Authority.” Id. at 2. The
Caesar Rodney Institute conducted an investigation of Delaware housing authorities and found
that all four housing authorities (the Delaware State Housing Authority, the Dover Housing
Authority, the Newark Housing Authority, and the Wilmington Housing Authority) banned
residents from owning firearms. Lee Williams, Delaware Public Housing: Defenseless by
Decree, CAESAR RODNEY INSTITUTE (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.caesarrodney.org
/pdfs/WHAmainPDF1.pdf. The NRA learned of these policies through the report issued by the
Caeser Rodney Institute and proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Wilmington Housing
Authority, alleging Second and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Lee Williams, NRA sues
Wilmington Housing Authority for violating residents’ Second Amendment rights, CAESAR
RODNEY INSTITUTE, BLOG (May 26, 2010) http://criblog.wordpress.com/2010/05/26
/breaking-news-nra-sues-wilmington-housing-authority-for-violating-residents%E2%80%99
-second-amendment-rights. The Caesar Rodney Institute is a non-profit, non-partisan “research
and education organization” focused on the Delaware community. About Us, CAESAR RODNEY
INSTITUTE, http://caesarrodney.org/index.cfm?ref=18100 (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
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amended its firearms policy to prohibit firearms only in common areas on
housing authority property.160 The plaintiffs amended their original complaint
to include the revised firearms policy, contending that even the common area
caveat violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms.161
The plaintiffs in Doe were a woman identified only as “Jane Doe” and
Charles Boone.162 As a result of their lease agreements and “House Rules” of
the facilities, both Doe and Boone were prohibited from possessing firearms on
WHA property and faced eviction if they did so.163 The defendants in Doe
were the WHA and Frederick S. Purnell, Sr., WHA’s executive director.164
WHA is a public corporate body of the State of Delaware tasked with
providing safe, affordable public housing to the City of Wilmington.165 WHA
is one of the largest Public Housing Authorities in Delaware, serving over
7,000 residents in nearly 2,000 units in the City of Wilmington.166 The Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence167 was admitted as amicus curiae for the
defendants.168
160. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20 (noting that the WHA passed Resolution No. 10-25 on
June 28, 2010, formally adopting the revised Firearms and Weapons Policy).
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 518. Doe lived at The Park View, a privately-owned complex managed by WHA.
Id. Boone lived at South Ridge Apartments, a WHA-owned-and-operated facility. Id.
163. Id. Doe’s lease agreement with WHA incorporated various House Rules, including one
that stated that “[t]enant is not permitted to display or use any firearms, BB guns, pellet guns,
slingshots, or other weapons on the premises.” Id. Boone’s lease agreement originally included a
provision stating that residents were “[n]ot to display, use, or possess . . . any firearms, (operable
or inoperable) or other dangerous instruments or deadly weapons as defined by the laws of the
State of Delaware anywhere on the property of the Authority.” Id.
164. Id.
165. About Us, WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, http://www.whadelaware.org/index.php
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (explaining that WHA’s mission has expanded to include
“develop[ing] safe, decent, and affordable housing”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 4302–4304 (2009 & Supp. 2012) (stating that housing authorities are vested with all powers
necessary and appropriate to “promote and protect the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
public”). Among the purposes of the general Delaware State Housing Authority, delineated in the
enabling law, is to establish and implement policies that “eliminate drug and crime problems” for
public housing residents. Id. at, § 4002(a)(7) (2009).
166. The Basics of Who We Are, WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, http://whadelaware.
org/Inside/about_us.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
167. The National Council to Control Handguns was founded in 1974, renamed Handgun
Control, Inc. in 1980, and then renamed the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence in 2001.
Our History, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.brady
campaign.org/?q=our-history (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). The Brady Campaign works to reduce
gun violence by lobbying “to pass, enforce, and protect sensible laws and public policy that
address gun violence at the federal and state level.” Our Work, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=our-work (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
168. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 520. The Brady Center argued in its amicus curiae brief that
outside the right to bear arms for self-defense, the Supreme Court “has never recognized a broad
right to carry or use guns on state-owned and managed property.” Brief for Amicus Curiae Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence in Support of Defendants, supra note 145, at 1. The Brady
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A. The District Court Upholds the Common Area Caveat
WHA formally adopted its amended firearms policy in October 2010, in
response to the McDonald decision.169 The plaintiffs challenged paragraphs
three and four of the new policy, which provide that
Residents, members of a resident’s household, and guests . . .
3. Shall not display or carry a firearm or other weapon in any
common area, except where the firearm or other weapon is being
transported to or from the resident’s unit, or is being used in
self-defense.
4. Shall have available for inspection a copy of any permit, license,
or other documentation required by state, local, or federal law for the
ownership, possession, or transportation of any firearm or other
weapon, including a license to carry a concealed weapon as required
by 11 Del C. § 1441, upon request, when there is reasonable cause to
believe that the law or this Policy has been violated.”170
The plaintiffs challenged the lease as violating their Second and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, even though neither plaintiff owned a firearm.171
The district court first addressed the Heller and McDonald decisions and
highlighted that “Heller suggested that the ‘core’ of the Second Amendment
right is the right of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.’”172 The court further explained, “the McDonald Court
described its ‘central holding in Heller’ as being that ‘the Second Amendment
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most
notably for self-defense within the home.’”173 After surveying Third Circuit
decisions that had considered Heller and McDonald, the court settled on
applying the Marzzarella test, as that case had “most extensively” considered
the Heller and McDonald decisions.174
Center further argued that the WHA policies are consistent with Heller and McDonald because
they “fully preserve Plaintiffs’ right to keep and use guns in the home for self-defense.” Id. at
2–3.
169. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (noting that the new policy replaced the corresponding
provisions in both Doe and Boone’s original lease agreements).
170. Id. at 519–20 (emphasis omitted).
171. Id. at 520–21. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
the suit against WHA because the plaintiffs did not own firearms and did “not really disagree
with the Revised Policy.” Id. at 522–23. The district court, however, held that the threat of
eviction and the dispute as to the constitutionality of the revised policy were sufficient to establish
standing. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the
original lease as moot, because the revised policy effectively replaced the original lease. Id. at
523–24.
172. Id. at 526 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)).
173. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010)).
174. Id. The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence advocated for the application of
Marzzarella to Doe. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendants, supra note 145, at 5–6.
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In applying the first prong of the Marzzarella test, the Doe court addressed
whether the Revised Policy burdens conduct protected by the Second
Amendment.175 The court agreed with WHA that “the common areas are
community spaces that WHA has the right and obligation to regulate.”176 The
Doe court contrasted the common areas, over which no single resident has
control, with a resident’s own apartment, from which the resident is able to
exclude all others.177 The court concluded that the common area caveat
regulates conduct that is beyond “the ‘core’ of what is protected by the Second
Amendment.”178
The court next asked whether the conduct would still fall within the scope of
the Second Amendment if it does not fall within the traditional core of Second
Amendment protection.179 The plaintiffs argued that Heller’s emphasis on
defense of the home does not foreclose the need for defense in other areas
outside of the home.180 WHA contended instead that Heller “is limited to
protecting a citizen’s right to possess a weapon in one’s home and does not
stretch to public places.”181 The Doe Court ultimately “decline[d] to determine
whether Second Amendment rights extend outside of the ‘hearth and
home.’”182 The Doe court explained that both the Supreme Court and the
Third Circuit had declined to expressly extend the Second Amendment beyond
the home; furthermore, the Supreme Court had repeatedly warned other courts
to “proceed with caution.”183
Having sidestepped the question, the Doe court still had to decide whether
the common area caveat violated the Second Amendment.184 Though some
gun regulations are “presumptively lawful,” the court followed Third Circuit
precedent to avoid the presumptively lawful analysis.185 Instead, the court
assumed that the common area caveat was not presumptively lawful and
proceeded to evaluate the regulations’ constitutionality.186 The Doe court
declined to apply the rational basis test, as proscribed by Heller.187 The court
also rejected the reasonable regulation test, the standard proposed by amicus,
The Brady Center, finding the test did “not provid[e] enough protection” for
175. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
176. Id. at 529.
177. Id. at 528–29.
178. Id. at 529 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 530 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 530–31.
186. Id. at 531.
187. Id. at 532 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n. 27) (“In Heller, the Supreme Court
explicitly declared that Second Amendment challenges may not be subjected merely to rational
basis review.”).
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Second Amendment rights.188 The court instead determined that intermediate
scrutiny should be applied, reasoning that, similar to the District of Columbia
ban in Heller, the WHA’s revised firearms policy did not completely ban
firearms.189 Instead the court noted that the revised policy “expressly
recognizes a right to possess firearms in the home,” and contained a
self-defense exception.190
Under Marzzarella, there must be a substantial government interest behind
the regulation, “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted
objective [must] be reasonable,” and the regulation must not be unnecessarily
burdensome.191 The Doe court concluded that the first part of the intermediate
scrutiny analysis was undisputedly satisfied, given that the plaintiffs conceded
that WHA had a substantial interest in ensuring the safety of its residents.192
Then the court evaluated whether the fit between the common area caveat and
WHA’s safety interest was reasonable, and concluded that “as a matter of
common sense,” it was reasonable.193 The Doe court went on to say that in
light of the WHA’s responsibility to provide safe housing, their “determination
that safety is best promoted by prohibiting possession of firearms in common
areas . . . is not so unreasonable as to fail intermediate scrutiny.”194 In short,
the Doe court upheld the common area caveat under intermediate scrutiny and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to sections three and four of
the WHA’s revised firearms policy.195
B. Reactions to Doe and the Common Area Caveat
The district court decided Doe on July 27, 2012196 and the plaintiffs filed an
appeal with the Third Circuit on August 27, 2012.197 Because the case is less
188. Id. at 533.
189. Id. at 534–35.
190. Id.
191. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
192. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (“[T]he stated goal of the Common Area Provision is to
promote and protect the safety of WHA residents, their guests, and WHA employees . . . WHA,
as a state agency, has an important and substantial interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its residents, their guests, its employees, and the public at large while on WHA
property.”).
193. Id. at 535–36.
194. Id. at 537. The plaintiffs had argued that the common area caveat created “an absurd
result” in that it “limit[ed] a tenant’s Second Amendment rights to only those occasions when
tenants are transporting their weapons to and from their units, while denying tenants the same
protection when they undertake any other activity within the common area.” Id. The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the policy caused this effect, but stated that the result was not
absurd and did not render the lease provision unconstitutional. Id.
195. Id. at 537 (granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
196. Id. at 541.
197. Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal, supra note 25. The plaintiffs in Doe “did not appeal the
District Court’s ruling dismissing their Second Amendment claims,” but did appeal “the District
Court’s rulings on their state constitutional claims.” Certification of Questions of Law at 8, Doe
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than two years old and primarily concerns local issues, most reactions to Doe
are local to the Delaware community and the parties involved in the actual
case.198 Purnell, WHA’s Executive Director, hailed the decision as a “good
day” for public housing residents, stating that the policy was intended to
protect tenants’ safety, not limit their rights.199 Dan Gross, President of the
Brady Campaign and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, praised Doe,
stating that it affirmed that “common-sense restrictions” on carrying guns in
public do not violate the Second Amendment.200 Daniel Vice, the senior
attorney for the Brady Center, said that because Doe is the first case to approve
restrictions on guns in public housing, it provides “an important precedent for
other housing authorities around the country.”201 Interestingly, the Delaware
General Assembly seemed to share these sentiments on the common area
caveats.202
Before the initial complaint in Doe was filed, Democratic Representative
John C. Atkins and Republican Senator Joseph Booth jointly sponsored
Delaware House Bill 357 (H.B. 357) and introduced the bill to the 145th
Delaware General Assembly on February 18, 2010 in response to the original
firearms policies of several Delaware public housing agencies.203 As originally
introduced, H.B. 357 sought to prohibit all state agencies from regulating,
restricting, or otherwise prohibiting firearms, except for security reasons at
governmental buildings.204 The bill was reportedly introduced as “a legislative
maneuver” to pressure the Delaware State Housing Authority, Dover Housing
Authority, and WHA to withdraw their firearms prohibitions.205 H.B. 357 was
subsequently amended to specifically limit public housing authorities from

v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 12-3433 (3d Cir. July 18, 2013). On July 18, 2013, the Third
Circuit certified to the Delaware Supreme Court “unresolved questions about how Article I, § 20
of the Delaware Constitution limits restrictions that may be placed on the right to bear arms.” Id.
at 2. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted cert by order dated July 30, 2013. Order at 2, Doe
v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 403,2013 (Del. July 30, 2013).
198. See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
199. Sullivan & Paul, supra note 26.
200. Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Court Dismisses Challenge to
Delaware Public Housing Gun Restrictions (July 31, 2012) http://www.noodls.com/view/noodl
/15360788.brady-center-to-prevent-gun-violence/court-dismisses-challenge-to-delaware-public
-housing-res.
201. O’Sullivan & Paul, supra note 26.
202. See infra notes 203–09.
203. H.B. 357, 145th General Assemb. (Del. 2010).
204. Id. The original prohibition stated that “[n]o public body in this state shall have or
exercise the authority to regulate, prohibit, restrict or license the ownership, transfer, possession
or transportation of arms, firearms, components of firearms, ammunition or components of
ammunition except as expressly and specifically authorized by act of the General Assembly.” Id.
205. Lee Williams, House Bill 357 Introduced to Overturn Public Housing Gun Bans,
CAESAR RODNEY INSTITUTE (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.caesarrodney.org/pdfs/WHABillStory
PDF.pdf.
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prohibiting the lawful ownership and possession of firearms.206 A later
amendment, however, provided that the public housing agencies have the
authority to regulate firearms in “common areas of property” that they own and
operate.207 Although H.B. 357, as amended, is currently stalled in the
Delaware Senate Finance Committee,208 the common area caveat clearly has
some support from the Delaware General Assembly.209
Beyond this local attention, the Doe holding and the common area caveat
have, thus far, garnered no attention from HUD or industry groups such as
CLPHA210 or the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials (NAHRO).211 Before Doe was officially filed, Maria Bynum, the
spokesperson for HUD’s field office in Philadelphia, which oversees the
Delaware area, told the Caesar Rodney Institute that HUD does not have an
206. H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 357, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2010) (prohibiting public
housing authorities from “hav[ing] or exercis[ing] the authority to regulate, prohibit or otherwise
restrict a lessee/tenant of a dwelling owned and operated by such public housing authority from
lawfully owning or possessing ammunition, arms or components thereof in such dwelling for the
defense of self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use and transporting
such ammunition, arms or components thereof to and from such dwelling”). Id. The bill was
initially amended to ensure that public housing authority residents “are afforded the same rights
as all citizens of Delaware.” Id.
207. H. Amend. 3 to H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 357, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2010) (adding a
subsection stating that “[n]othing herein shall be construed to prohibit or otherwise restrict a
public housing authority from regulating, prohibiting or otherwise restricting the possession of a
firearm(s) in the common areas of property owned or operated by a public housing authority,
including, but not limited to, playgrounds, community centers, daycare centers or office space”).
208. See H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 357 w/H. Amend. 3, 145th Gen. Assemb., DEL. GEN.
ASSEMB., http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis145.nsf/93487d394bc01014882569a4007a4cb7/eeb8
cbe512243bfc852577190070cc81?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 18, 2013) (listing the current
status of the bill as sent to the Senate Finance Committee on June 23, 2010).
209. See supra notes 206–07.
210. A basic search of the CLPHA website for “Wilmington Housing Authority,” “firearm,”
or “gun” provides only one relevant result—a link to a June 26, 2008 CLPHA Weekly Report
about the Asset Management Improvement Act of 2008. See June 26, 2008 CLPHA Weekly
Report, CLPHA (June 26, 2008), http://www.clpha.org/2008report0626?s=firearm (discussing an
amendment to the Asset Management Improvement Act of 2008 that would prevent housing
authorities from prohibiting legal firearm possession through lease agreements).
211. A basic search of the NAHRO website for “Wilmington Housing Authority,” “firearm,”
or “gun” provides only one relevant result—a link to a Top Story regarding the Housing
Preservation and Tenant Protection Act of 2010. House Committee Passes “Housing
Preservation and Tenant Protection Act of 2010, Top Stories, NAHRO (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://www.nahro.org/house-committee-passes-housing-preservation-and-tenant-protection-act
-2010 (analyzing, among other things, a debate as to “whether residents receiving federal housing
assistance should be allowed to own guns”). The Act was never enacted. H.R. 4868 (111th):
Housing Preservation and Tenant Protection Act of 2010, Bills, GOV. TRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4868 (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). NAHRO “is the
leading housing and community development advocate” for affordable housing in the United
States. About NAHRO, NAHRO, http://www.nahro.org/about-nahro (last visited Aug 2, 2013).
NAHRO’s membership includes about 23,000 housing agencies and officials. Mission Statement,
NAHRO, http://www.nahro.org/nahro-mission (last accessed Nov. 19, 2012).
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official policy relating to restrictions on firearms in public housing.212 Bynum
also told the Caesar Rodney Institute also that “[l]eases are a local thing that
HUD does not control.”213 Also before the lawsuit was filed, Bill Maher,
general counsel for NAHRO, stated that NAHRO supports “reasonable
restrictions on gun possession” by public housing authorities, but that under
McDonald, public housing authorities “can’t ban [gun possession] outright.”214
III. ANALYZING DOE AND THE COMMON AREA CAVEAT
Given the prior precedent and public policy considerations implicated by the
common area caveat, the Doe court correctly upheld the common area
caveat.215 To determine whether the common area caveat violated the Second
Amendment, the Doe court worked within the framework of the Supreme
Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions and the Third Circuit’s Marzzarella
test.216 The common area caveat is, at its core, a regulation that balances the
individual right to bear arms and tenant safety in common areas.217
Considering the limitations placed on gun regulations by Heller and
McDonald, the Doe court correctly concluded that the common area caveat is
constitutional.218
Under Heller and McDonald it is apparent that the Second Amendment
provides an individual right to bear arms.219 Heller and McDonald establish
that rational basis review is not the appropriate standard of review to apply to
Second Amendment challenges.220 However, the Court declined to explain in
either Heller or McDonald what specifically constitutes a Second Amendment
violation or what standard of review is appropriate in evaluating Second
Amendment claims.221 The Doe court recognized this, and looked to the Third
Circuit’s Marzzarella decision for guidance.222

212. Lee Williams, HUD: Public Housing gun bans a local decision, CAESAR RODNEY
INSTITUTE (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.caesarrodney.org/pdfs/WHAlegalfolloPDF.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Ideas and Trends, Wilmington Housing Authority Plans to End Ban on Gun Possession,
38 HOUSING & DEV. REP. [CURRENT DEV.] 520, 520 (2010).
215. See infra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
217. See Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536–37 (D. Del. 2012), (C.A.
No. 1:10-00473-LPS), cert. granted (De. July 30, 2013) (explaining that the WHA’s obligation to
ensure the safety of all people on their property justifies the burden the common area caveat
imposes on the tenants’ right to bear arms).
218. The plaintiffs arguably agree, as they did not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of
their Second Amendment claims. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal, supra note 25.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
220. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
221. See supra notes 89–92.
222. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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The Doe court was right to apply the two-pronged Marzzarella test223
conservatively, declining to determine whether the individual right to bear
arms extended to common areas,224 but still proceeding to analyze whether the
common area caveat withstood intermediate level scrutiny.225 If the first prong
of the Marzzarella test is answered in the negative, then no further analysis is
required.226 The Doe court was correct to be cautious, and rather than decide
this question, proceeded to the second prong of the Marzzarella test.227 This
conservative approach to the question of Second Amendment protections
allowed the Doe court to conduct the intermediate scrutiny analysis without
setting a precedent that could prove problematic in the future.228 The Doe
court’s approach was also prudent in light of the fact that neither the Supreme
Court nor the Third Circuit “have expressly recognized a Second Amendment
right” outside of the home.229
Furthermore, even if Third Circuit precedent had not prescribed intermediate
scrutiny, the Doe court correctly declined to apply strict scrutiny to the
The common area caveat can be
common area caveat analysis.230
distinguished from the ban on firearms like the District of Columbia ban that
was overturned in Heller,231 or the statutorily-mandated ban overturned in
McDonald.232 In fact, the common area caveat arguably provides for the
individual right to bear arms by specifically restricting firearms only in
common areas, subject to two exceptions—transportation “to or from the
resident’s unit” and self-defense.233 Given that Heller and McDonald
explicitly prohibit applying rational basis review, while also, arguably,
implicitly prohibiting strict scrutiny analysis in cases such as the one at issue,
the Doe court was left with no other choice but to apply intermediate
scrutiny.234

223. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
226. Id. (explaining that under the first prong, if the conduct does not fall “within the scope
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,” the court’s “inquiry is complete”).
227. Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F.Supp.2d 513, 530–32.
228. See Doe, 880 F.Supp.2d at 530–31 (upholding the revised firearms policy under
intermediate scrutiny, but declining to rule on whether Heller applies outside of the home).
229. Id. at 530.
230. See infra 231–34 and accompanying text.
231. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 576 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008) (explaining nature of
the D.C. firearms ban at issue).
232. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (describing the Chicago
firearms ordinance at issue).
233. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 534–35.
234. Id. at 532–34 (explaining the court’s decision to apply intermediate scrutiny in light of
Heller’s rejection of rational basis review for Second Amendment challenges and the fact that
strict scrutiny should only be applied in cases where gun possession is severely limited).

1142

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:1113

In applying intermediate scrutiny to the common area caveat, the court must
determine whether the restriction of firearms in common areas is “substantially
Under
related” to achieving an important governmental purpose.235
Marzzarella, the court must also be satisfied that the challenged regulation fits
reasonably with the governmental purpose and does not unnecessarily burden
the individual right to bear arms.236 WHA, like all other housing authorities, is
mandated by the 1937 Act to provide safe housing for its tenants.237 Even the
plaintiffs in Doe conceded that ensuring the safety of WHA’s residents
qualified as an important governmental purpose.238 Thus, the Doe court
appropriately concluded that the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test was
satisfied.239 Furthermore, a workable and effective gun control policy is
arguably an integral part of WHA’s safety interests.240 The common area
caveat simultaneously acknowledges the importance of the Second
Amendment by allowing for the possession of legal weapons in a tenant’s unit
and provides a mechanism for ensuring tenant safety outside of the unit, that is
in the common areas.241 Thus, the Doe court was correct to conclude “as a
matter of common sense” that there is a reasonable fit between the common
area caveat and WHA’s interest in ensuring tenant safety in the common
areas.242
IV. CONCLUSION
The common area caveat allows housing authorities to strike a delicate
balance between respecting the individual right to bear arms and fulfilling their
mandate under the 1937 Act to provide safe housing to their tenants. A recent
survey of 335 public housing authorities revealed that only forty-one percent
had firearms prohibitions in place.243 By adopting the common area caveat,
public housing authorities will be able to provide greater safety for their
tenants, while simultaneously respecting the tenants’ Second Amendment
235. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an
essential requirement of scrutiny is showing that the statute or regulation in question is
“substantially related to an important governmental objective”).
236. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
237. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a), 1437(c)-1(d)(14) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 4302–4304 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
238. Doe, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (D.Del. 2012).
239. Id.
240. See id. (noting that “the stated goal of the Common Area Provision is to promote and
protect the safety of WHA residents, their guests, and WHA employees. . . WHA, as a state
agency has an important and substantial interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
residents, their guests, its employees, and the public at large while on WHA property”).
241. Id. at 533 (explaining that the common area caveat does not completely ban the
possession of firearms, but instead allows residents to exercise their Second Amendment rights
within their own homes).
242. Id. at 535–36.
243. Wilmington Housing Authority Plans to End Ban on Gun Possession, supra note 214.
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rights. After all, safety on public housing authority property should not be
subordinated to gun rights.244

244. See Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants, supra note 156, at 2 (“Public housing safety must not be forsaken in the drive for
new, and ever-expanding, gun rights”).
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